This article provides a theoretical synthesis of the New Economic Geography to analyse the links between trade, FDI and migrations. We find that liberalizing from high trade costs, a country can attract both capital and labour -the bifurcation pattern is a gradual peripheral exodus of workers associated with capital flight from the periphery -but after a threshold of trade costs, opening trade generates return migration toward the periphery while capital remains agglomerated in the core. The model is built on the assumption that factors are sector specific. By relaxing this assumption and by providing a second model where workers are mobile between industries (vertically linked) but also between countries we confirm this result.
Introduction
What is Globalization? Ask a first-year student, he will answer that it is the integration of national economies into the world economy through trade, capital flows, and migration. But surprisingly, while this term appears repeatedly in all newspapers, it is often analysed partially through a focus on only one variable. Even in academic literature, the whole picture is rarely taken. Indeed, there are few models that analyse simultaneously these three flows and their interconnection.
To illustrate this, consider a particular economy with:
(i) symmetry in factor endowments between countries
Correspondence Address: Fabien Candau, CATT, Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, France. Email: fabien.candau@univ-pau.fr (ii) identical technologies across space (iii) constant returns to scale and perfect competition Relaxing (i), you will have the Heckscher (1918) , Ohlin (1933) and Mundell (1957) model, which predicts that capital and labour should move in opposite directions: capital scarce countries should attract capital, while labour scarce countries should attract labour. In analysing facts, such a result is debatable. For instance, the United States has attracted a high share of the world's capital during the past decades but also a significant part of the world's workers. Such a result does not belong exclusively to this second global century. Economists interested in the age of mass migration before 1914 1 clearly indicate that the United States absorbed capital and labour and five European nations sent out both (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK).
The theoretical substitutability between factors is also found between trade and international factor movements. Capital flows or migrations by reducing endowment differences eliminate the trade cause in standard models -a result that seems dubious in an era of high financial integration and significant trade exchanges.
By relaxing (i) and (ii) one obtains the HOS model with Ricardian features of Kemp (1966) , Jones (1967) and Purvis (1972) . Purvis (1972) in particular shows that the introduction of capital mobility into a free trade framework can increase the volume of trade. Thus, the mobility and trade factors are substitutes when technologies differ. Lastly, in three different models, Markusen (1983) relaxes successively (ii) and (iii) by adding technological advantages, external economies of scale and monopoly, which allows him to conclude that the substitutability between 'trade in goods and factors is in fact a rather special result which is a general characteristic only of factor proportions models'. But with Neary (1995) one can consider that these separated models do not give a simple general equilibrium model of trade and factor mobility. 2 Building on a two-country version of the specific-factors model of Jones (1971) with international capital flows, this author shows that the complementarity found by Markusen depends on the assumption that capital is used in the exporting sector.
In the New Economic Geography, which relaxes (iii), the disconnection between the location choice of workers and capital, at least on the theoretical ground, is striking: Martin & Rogers (1995) have built a model on footloose capital where labour is immobile while Krugman (1991) 3 focuses on the mobility of labour. A comparison of the two models has been brilliantly done in Baldwin et al. (2003) but no bridge has been built until now between these models. 4 We propose to fill this gap by merging them, which allows analysing the complementarity between capital flows, migration and trade through pecuniary externalities.
In the current model, migration leads to expenditure shifting because workers spend their incomes locally and expenditure shifting leads to production shifting because firms earn more by relocating their activities near the demand. Moreover, a circular causality is also generated by this relocation because more production in one country implies a fall of imported goods and thus reduces the cost of living. If we now introduce capital, this circular causality may be reinforced because agglomeration of capital implies a decrease in prices of goods that are produced with this factor under increasing returns. Ceteris paribus, this raises the real wage where agglomeration occurs, which attracts more migrants. But this circular causality can be broken by urban costs. Indeed, following recent empirical researches showing that immigration clearly impacts on house prices at least in small countries, 5 we integrate land rent and commuting costs. These urban features imply a dispersion of individuals only when trade is free enough while capital does not follow this dispersion and remains agglomerated. Agglomeration of one factor leads to the agglomeration of the other, but dispersion of one factor is not necessary sufficient to foster a dispersion of the second one. Our model thus mainly focuses on small countries, but it is important to notice that our definition of a small country differs strongly from the one retained in international trade. Indeed, we consider as a small country, a country that has land constraint. Thus, this definition includes countries with high GDP such as Japan. Concerning this country, the link between trade, migration of entrepreneurs and urban costs, as it is described in our model, is illustrated in Fujita et al. (2001) who consider that on account of higher wages and land prices in the three largest metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya), the growth rate of net migration has been affected. In particular authors have pointed out:
Given the high valued yen and the high wage rate in Japan together with the successive reduction in 'transport costs', many large manufacturing firms successively moved an increasing share of their labor-intensive operations to the low-wage countries (in particular, those in East Asia).
[…] The continued growth of Tokyo, meanwhile, fuelled the ever rising landprices there since the mid 1970s, which soon spread to other major cities in Japan. Such an accelerating increase in land prices ended up creating huge 'bubbles' in land markets in Japan by the late 1980s, which busted in the early 1990s. This burst of land markets (together with stock markets) destroyed the foundations of the traditional financial system of Japan, resulting in the prolonged recession since the early 1990s [which] quickly curtailed the net migration to the Tokyo MA, resulting in a negative rate of net migration to the Tokyo MA in 1994 which happened for the first time since 1955. We do not model such a complex story, but try to capture the basic idea that migration can destroy itself by rising land-prices.
This model is obviously based on specific assumptions concerning agglomerative and dispersive forces. In order to see whether it produces peculiar results owing to peculiar assumptions, we propose a second model with different assumptions.
Indeed, urban features are removed and Ethier's (1982) formulation of international economics is adopted by working with vertical linkages between firms that are mobile at the global level. 6 Moreover in this model, workers are also mobile between countries and between sectors. 7 This generates new forces but similar results: trade liberalization leads to an agglomeration of firms and workers in a first stage, but in a second one, while firms stay agglomerated, workers choose to leave the core for the periphery.
The choice to present two different models is not unique in the literature. 8 We obviously also emphasize the main differences between these models, and this may be interesting for empirical analysis 9 on FDI, trade and migration where urban costs are rarely integrated.
Footloose Capital and Entrepreneurs in the City
Consider an economy with two regions (labelled r = 1, 2) and three sectors, two monopolistic sectors (labelled k = A, B) that produce differentiated products under increasing returns to scale using skilled and unskilled workers (h) in sector A and capital (K) in sector B; and a constant return to scale sector (labelled C) that produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition. Each region is formed by a city spread along a one-dimensional space X. The amount of land available at each location x ∈ X is equal to one. Skilled workers (also called entrepreneurs in the literature) are mobile from one city to the next but also inside each city. More precisely, skilled workers who own one unit of land are spread along a line, and because their business is located in the middle of this line (called the Central Business District (CBD)), they need to commute. Indeed all firms located in region r set up a headquarters at the CBD situated at the origin x = 0 of X. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the unskilled live at the suburb where the 6 More precisely, we work on the Ottaviano & Robert-Nicoud (2006) model, which is a simplification of the Krugman & Venables (1995) model. 7 We integrate the probabilistic migration of Tabuchi & Thisse (2002) and Russek (2008) , that stresses taste heterogeneity in residential location in the vertical linkages model. 8 For instance Helpman (1998) proposes a model with product differentiation à la Dixit-Stiglitz and another one with homogeneous goods and external economies of scale. From these two different models, similar results are obtained, trade liberalization fosters dispersion in the presence of a given amount of housing, which allows the author to conclude that there is nothing peculiar in his result. 9 Several theoretical models are also used to check the robustness of results and to analyse the main determinants of bilateral trade in the literature on gravity equations. For instance Evenett and Keller (2002) distinguish four kinds of 2 × 2 × 2 models: (1) Increasing Returns Sectors (IRS) with perfect specialization between countries; (2) a Heckscher-Ohlin-based perfect specialization model called HO multicone; (3) an IRS model incorporating imperfect specialization model, called IRS/HO unicone; (4) an HO-based imperfect specialization, namely a unicone HO model. In the same spirit, Feenstra et al. (2001) propose to derive gravity equations from models with increasing returns and differentiation and then with homogeneous goods and segmentation (reciprocal dumping models). See Candau & Dienesch (2011) for a survey on the various theoretical foundations of similar gravity equations. land rent is null and do not need to commute to work. Capital owners also live at the periphery of cities and are immobile from one region to the other. Capital freely moves to the region with the highest nominal reward. Nominal rewards of capitalist and entrepreneurs are denoted ω k r with k = A, B and r = 1, 2 and each skilled worker owns an equal share of the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR) where he resides. The standard micro-foundations of this urban framework concerning skilled workers can be found in Alonso (1964) and Fujita (1989) 10 and can be described as follows.
Commuting costs have a direct impact on the labour force of skilled workers. Each skilled worker consumes one unit of land, supplies one unit of labour, and commutes to the CBD. Hence, in equilibrium, skilled are equally distributed around the CBD of region r whose urban landscape is therefore given by [−h r /2, h r /2] with h r the number of skilled workers in region r. Commuting costs have an iceberg form, thus implying that the effective labour supply by a skilled worker living at a distance | x | from the CBD is given by:
where θ (with θ < 1) is skilled worker's commuting cost, | x | measures distance to CBD. Indeed as the number of skilled in one city is h r , the maximal distance from the CBD is h r 2 ; thus, the total labour supply net of commuting cost in one city is equal to :
As land rent at both edges of the segment is normalized to zero, if ω A r is the wage of skilled near the CBD, then wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges is:
(3) Because consumers are identical in terms of preferences and income, at equilibrium they must reach the same utility level. Thus, skilled workers who live on the fringe of the segment only receive a net wage of (1 − θ h r )ω A r but pay no land rent. On the contrary, workers who live near the CBD do not pay significant commuting costs, but the price of the services yielded by land is higher in this location. Thus, the increase in nominal wage near central places offsets land rent. Figure 1 depicts this situation. In Figure 1 , the vertical axis measures the net wage in the city, while 10 See, among others, Krugman & Livas (1996) , Murata & Thisse (2005) , Behrens & Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Candau (2008a Candau ( , b, 2011 who also use this framework in different models. 11 We can notice that when an entrepreneur moves from one city to the other then the line segment becomes longer because a new unit of land is added at the extremity of the city (each entrepreneur owns one unit of land). By assumption, however, the CBD is still in the middle of the segment. Then one can imagine that the CBD changes along this line to locate it in the middle again. All these assumptions are standard and identical to Murata & Thisse (2005) and Krugman & Livas (1996) . Obviously we can notice with Krugman & Livas that 'ideally the need for a central business district would itself be derived from the model, but this is left for later research'. the horizontal axis shows the size of this city. Because each entrepreneur owns one land unit, this size only depends on their number. As Figure 1 shows, a move from the suburb to the CBD implies a decrease in commuting and therefore an increase in net wage, but also an equivalent increase in land rent, which equalizes utility among individuals.
In other terms, the following condition must be verified:
is the total amount supplied by a skilled worker who lives on the fringe of the CBD, R r (x) is the land rent prevailing at x in region r, while the right-hand side represents the wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges given by equation (3). By inserting expression (1) into this system we find the following land rent:
From this equation we can find the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR):
While on the one hand, Tabuchi (1998) assumes that there are absentee landlords, and on the other, Helpman (1998) assumes that the aggregate land rent is owned at the global level, here it is considered with Murata & Thisse (2005) that each skilled worker owns an equal share of the ALR where they reside. Thus, their non-salaried income is:
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Each household's preferences take the Dixit (1990) form introduced by Pflüger (2004) in the NEG literature:
where C k r is the consumption of a k manufactures aggregate, n k r is the set of k varieties produced in region r and n k s varieties k produced in region s (r, s = 1, 2), σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among these varieties. m k rr represents consumption of a particular variety produced and consumed locally in country r, while m k rs represents the consumption in r of a variety produced in s. C C is the consumption of an homogeneous good that is produced under constant return to scale using unskilled workers.
Varieties are exchanged between regions under transaction costs, which take the form of iceberg costs: τ > 1 units of the variety must be sent from the origin for one unit to arrive at the destination. In contrast, there are no trade costs within a region and varieties A and B are traded at the same cost.
Then the solution to the utility maximization problem generates the following demands in r for a typical variety produced respectively in location r and s:
with P k r the price index in r for k varieties:
2.1 Supply 2.1.1 Sector C Perfect competition ensures that the traditional good is priced at its marginal cost. Moreover, this good is chosen as the numéraire, and since it is traded costlessly, the nominal wage rate is unity in countries 1 and 2. Moreover unskilled workers are equally spread between regions 1 and 2, thus:
where L w is the world population of unskilled normalized to one.
Sectors A and B
The sole difference between sectors A and B is that factors of production differ. For the sake of simplicity everything else is identical. In particular, concerning the cost function, the production of a typical variety of manufactured goods involves α units of capital and skilled services as a fixed cost in sectors A and B respectively. The variable cost requires β units of unskilled workers in A and B. But as the unskilled are located outside the city, it is assumed that production is being conducted in suburban areas, which raises the marginal cost by a factor ϕ.
In other words the firm is spatially fragmented with headquarters in the CBD and plants at the periphery. Thus, ϕ can be understood as communication or transport costs between the unskilled who perform routine tasks at the periphery and skilled workers or capital that are used to perform service tasks in the CBD (financial tasks for instance). Such a cost function, which is in essence an assumption of convenience, turns out to be justifiable on empirical grounds. Moreover a similar modelling has been used by Fujita & Thisse (2006) with firms fragmented at the international level. 12 Thus, the total cost of producing y k r (i) units of a typical manufactured variety is:
Such a cost function is widely used in the literature (see for instance , which also assumes that α = 1 and β = σ −1 σ . Workers are qualified or skilled since they enter in the fixed cost of production. In the spirit of , they are necessary to the firm in order to develop a new idea that gives its characteristics to the variety.
Thus, each firm is a monopolist in the production of its variety and maximizes its profit with:
According to the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, a typical firm sets the following price:
With the input-output coefficient equal to the reverse of the mark-up, prices are equal to one where the variety is produced and to τ ϕ when the variety is imported. Under free entry, profits are always equal to zero, which, using equations (8) and (10), gives the level of output:
In equilibrium, a typical firm employs one unit of factor, so that the total demand is n. As skilled labour supply is exactly S, and capital supply is K, the equalization gives the number of varieties produced in each sector:
The number of varieties B in one region is thus identical to the quantity of capital while the number of varieties produced by the sector A is proportional to the number of skilled workers. One can prove that the more symmetric the spatial distribution of skilled workers, the larger the total mass of varieties A in the economy. Indeed by inserting S 1 given by equation (2) in equation (12) and by differentiating the total mass of varieties with respect to h 1 (the sum of the population is normalized to one:
Thus, the number of varieties is maximized at h 1 = 1/2 and declines as h 1 increases. This corresponds to Proposition 1 of Murata & Thisse (2005) who clearly states the intuition behind this result:
Intuitively, when the economy is dispersed, commuting costs are lower, thus implying that more labor is available for the industrial sector. The fact that the total mass of varieties varies with the spatial distribution of workers makes our model more general than the existing ones in which the total number of varieties is constant regardless of the spatial distribution of firms. More precisely, Proposition 1 shows that agglomeration generates two types of costs for the workers: higher urban costs as well as a narrower range of varieties.
With Murata & Thisse (2005) , it is worth stressing that there is no technological spillovers here. This may be an simple extension of our work because capital is already integrated.
Market clearing
By equalizing the total demand of varieties addressed to a northern firm to its supply we get: 13
and = 1 − a for k = B
Migration to region 1 (h 1 ↑) increases nominal reward there and decrease it in region 2. That's the market access effect. Its evolution is worth stressing.
Proposition 1 Migration plays positively on the market access but this positive effect decreases with trade liberalization and with urban costs.
Proof. By considering that price indexes are constant, one obtains:
Then by starting from a symmetric case where P k 1 = P k 2 one can verify that sign
This completes the proof.
One can notice that FDI (K 1 ↑) does not impact on this effect. 14 In opposition to this agglomerative force, more firms in region 1 (n k 1 ↑) foster competition and reduce nominal reward (if φ < 1). That's the market crowding effect.
In the long run, factors are mobile, capital and skilled workers move towards the nation with the highest rewards. A standard assumption is to consider that capital owners are immobile internationally and that rents from capital earned abroad are repatriated. Thus, by denoting B the differential rewards:
there is a stable total agglomeration in region 1 if B K 1 =1 ≥ 0, a stable agglomeration of capital in region 2 if B K 1 =0 ≤ 1 and a stable dispersed equilibrium if
Concerning skilled workers, in the long run, they are mobile between countries and migrate towards the nation with the highest indirect utility. Utility maximization yields the indirect utility function V H 1 in region 1 and V H 2 in region 2, which allows us to get the following indirect utility differential
where 1 − θ 2 h r ω A r comes from the income of land ownership (θh r ω A r /2) and from the wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges ((1 − θh r )ω A r ).
In this equation of migration two additional forces appear: on the one hand the term (1 − θ h r /2), creates a dispersive force independently of trade costs, which is the land market-crowding effect. On the other hand, the third term P k 2 /P k 1 is an agglomerative force, indeed goods are cheaper in the agglomerated area because imports are lower and thus the burden of trade costs are also lower. This last force is the supplier market access. Let us analyse its change with respect to trade costs.
Proposition 2 Migration and capital entry play positively on the supplier access but this positive effect decreases with trade liberalization.
Proof. In sector A, relative price index is given by
The same results are obtained in the B sector by replacing h 1 by k 1 in price indices. This completes the proof.
A new circular causality comes from the pecuniary externalities between sectors A and B. Indeed, contrary to the symmetric FC model where neither demandlinked nor cost-linked circular causality is generated (see Baldwin et al. 2003, p. 82) , here from equation (14) with k = B it is clear that more skilled workers in region 1 generate more outlets and profits in sector B and thus attract capital. This new entry of capital reduces the price index in sector B, which (according to equation (18)) increases the attractiveness of region 1 for skilled workers. This new migration can in turn attract capital and so on.
Location Choice
The relationship between migration and capital flow in sector B is obtained by solving A = 0 with respect to K 1 and gives:
Let us first observe that the location of capital equalizing capital rents internationally is strictly increasing in h 1 from autarky to free trade. This means that migration always attracts capital. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) represent such a result by plotting equation (20), i.e the location of capital K 1 , as a function of skilled workers h 1 for two different level of trade opening. Such a result comes from the fact that migration induces a spatial expenditure shifting (market access effect) for firms operating in sector B.
Thus, if h 1 = 1/2 dispersion is always a stable equilibrium regardless of the value of trade costs, but if h 1 > 1/2 then partial agglomeration occurs in sector B. This partial agglomeration ends up a total agglomeration of capital if K 1 = 0. Thus, by solving equation (20) with such a value one obtains the level of trade costs at which a total agglomeration of capital in region 1 occurs:
Such an expression is very useful since it allows using equation (20) for all trade levels between autarky and φ K (which satisfies B K 1 =1 = 0) and K 1 = 1 for all levels of trade costs between φ K and free trade.
Thus, by using the share of capital as a function of skilled workers (equation (20)) in nominal wages (equations (14) and (15) with k = A) and by inserting these expressions in the location choice of entrepreneurs (equation (18)) one can analyse how migration evolves according to trade liberalization. By this means, numerical simulation in Figures 2(a) and 2(c) are obtained. 15 The horizontal axis represents the share of skilled workers in region 1 and the vertical axis A . For high trade costs (φ = 0.3) dispersion of skilled workers (h 1 = 1/2) is stable which ensures, as we have just pointed out, that dispersion of capital is also a stable equilibrium. Figure 2(b) represents such a result by plotting the location of capital, equation (20), as a function of skilled workers h 1 .
When trade is liberalized, agglomeration of entrepreneurs (Figure 2(c) ) and capital (Figure 2(d) ) occurs gradually and one can observe that the agglomeration of capital emerges sooner than that of skilled workers. 16 Indeed, in Figure 2 (c) when 80% of skilled workers are agglomerated in region 1 (for φ = 0.463), this region already hosts 90% of FDI. 17 When trade is liberalized even more, a total agglomeration of capital occurs, nominal rewards in sector B are higher in region 1 than in region 2 ( B > 0). The literature speaks about an agglomeration rent to illustrate this situation. More liberalization yields a total agglomeration of skilled workers but for lower trade costs the land market crowding effect dominates agglomeration forces, the cost of living in the big cities being too high for skilled workers who return to their region of origin. Figure 3 sums up these results by plotting the location of capital and entrepreneurs with respect to trade freeness. It illustrates that agglomeration of capital occurs gradually and stays stable until free trade, while agglomeration of entrepreneurs only occurs for intermediate level of trade costs. This result obviously comes from urban costs, without them agglomeration of both factors is stable even for low trade costs. This reveals the importance of these costs around free trade. To conclude, we retain the following result: agglomeration of capital attracts skilled workers, while dispersion of skilled workers does not generate a dispersion of capital. In other words, agglomeration of skilled workers and capital is a virtuous circle for the region that hosts these factors, while dispersion of skilled is not a vicious circle for FDI, which still benefits from an agglomeration rent when trade is liberalized.
These results need however to be confirmed. Indeed, our model is clearly specific, perhaps the most critical assumption concerns the sector specific factor we use. This assumption has been presented by Caves (1971) , who considered that capital can be a composite factor that is more mobile between two identical sectors of different countries than between two different sectors of the same region. One believes that such a relationship can also be applied to highly skilled workers, but that limits the generality of our analysis. Moreover, the empirical findings of the domestic versus international capital mobility do not fully support the capital sector specific assumption 18 and lastly one wants to introduce other agglomeration forces such as vertical linkages between firms and other dispersive forces, such as migration costs (attachment to home, costs of moving, etc) to test the robustness of our result. 16 We have done numerous simulations to check this result, and it seems surprisingly robust. Indeed K 1 given by equation (20) and plotted for instance in Figure 2(d) above the 45 • line, which explains why agglomeration of capital occurs sooner. For higher commuting costs, the relationship between capital and workers is below the 45 • line indicating that total agglomeration of entrepreneurs may occur sooner than that of capital. But for these high levels of commuting costs, dispersion of entrepreneurs is the sole stable equilibrium. 17 We focus here on cases where agglomeration occurs in region 1. But in reason of multiple equilibria the same results hold in cases with agglomeration in region 2. 18 See for instance Reitzes & Roussland (1988) . 
Location of Unskilled Workers and of Firms with Vertical Linkages
The model is based on Ottaviano & Robert-Nicoud (2006) (ORN hereafter) . The economy is composed of two regions, two sectors (superscript B and C) and one factor of production, labour (L). This factor is freely mobile between sectors; thus, we relax the factor specific sector assumption previously made. Moreover, this factor is mobile across countries, but incurs migration costs that vary from one worker to another. These are monetary costs (such as travel costs or the costs of moving out etc) and/or psychological costs (such as attachment to home etc).
Regions are labelled as previously with a subscript r = 1, 2. The utility function for a typical individual in r takes a Dixit-Stiglitz form. More precisely, the upper tier utility is a Cobb-Douglas function, the individual spends a share μ of income Y r on the composite manufacturing good C B and a share 1 − μ on the homogeneous good C C . The industrial good is a composite of n w varieties (w for world) captured by a constant elasticity of substitution σ > 1 between any pair of varieties k. The dual of this, the indirect utility function is given by:
where P r is the price index in the region r.
As in the previous model, the homogeneous good C C is produced under perfect competition and constant returns to scale whereas the industrial sector produces different varieties under increasing returns to scale. Firms evolve in a monopolistic competition framework in the wake of Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) , which means that the different varieties that consumers buy are also used as an input (in addition to labour) into the production of each variety. This well-known tricky assumption allows presenting input-output linkages without introducing two sorts of industries. 19 Labour and composite input enter in the variable cost and fixed cost via a Cobb-Douglas function, more precisely, the following total cost is considered:
r P γ r y r (i) with γ and ρ the elasticities of substitution between the inputs in fixed and variable costs and ω the workers' nominal wage. From this equation, we assume that γ = 0, thus the fixed costs only depend on industrial goods while the variable costs are only a function of labour. Such a cost function is in the spirit of Flam & Helpman (1987) who also assume that different inputs impact differently on fixed and variable costs. Since the price of the homogeneous good is taken as the numéraire, under perfect competition and without trade costs, we get: ω r = 1 and this gives:
TC r (i) = αP ρ r + βy r (i) ORN make an additional simplification by assuming that the technology to produce industrial varieties use intermediate inputs in the same proportion that consumers spend their incomes: ρ = μ.
By maximizing its pure profit (denoted while operating profit is denoted π such as in region r: r = π r − αP r with π r = (p r − α)y), a typical firm in region r sets the following price:
Thus, when inserting this price in equation (23) one can observe that, compared with Puga (1999) there is no recursivity in the definition of the price index, which makes the present model much more tractable than the original one. With this price, profit in r is:
which gives under free entry and exit:
Trade in industrial goods occurs under the assumption of 'iceberg trade costs': τ units must be shipped for one unit to arrive in the other region. The delivered price p s of a variety produced in r is τ p r which gives p s = τ σβ σ −1 . These trade costs can be interpreted as a package of transaction costs, tariff and non-tariff costs, transport costs and time costs. To simplify notation, it is assumed with the literature that β is equal to the reverse of the mark up (i.e β = σ −1 σ ). This simplifies price to unity when goods are sold locally and to τ when they are sold abroad. From this and equation (23), the northern price index is:
is a measure of trade openness. For instance, with φ = 0 countries are in autarky while φ = 1 is a situation of free trade.
By using the Shephard's lemma for the total cost, the Roy identity on the indirect utility, the market clearing condition is obtained and given in region 1 by:
with
From this equation (and its twin) in the South one obtains y 1 (and y 2 ):
y 1 = μ(L 1 (φn 1 + n 2 ) + L 2 (n 1 + φn 2 )φ + μσ −1 L 1 n 2 (φ 2 − 1)) μσ −1 [n 2 (n 1 + φn 2 ) + n 1 (φn 1 + n 2 )] + μ 2 σ −2 n 1 n 2 (φ 2 − 1) −(φn 1 + n 2 )(n 1 + φn 2 )
Two forces drives the level of output in one region, the supplier access effect (via price index) and the market crowding effect. The former is an agglomerative force, firms like to locate close to their customers as this decreases their shipping costs. Thus, relocations of firms in the region with the higher market potential entails a growth of production in this location. The latter is a dispersive force, firms do not like to locate close to their competitors as this reduces their output prices and increases input prices. In the long run, firms choose the location of production according to pure profits. With Ottaviano & Robert-Nicoud (2006) it is assumed that each new firm is created (closed) in each region as long as profits are positive (negative) or as long as π r P ρ r is larger than unity (which is equivalent indeed 1 = π 1 − αP ρ 1 = 0 ⇔ π r αP ρ r = 1 thus, a firm enters if π r αP ρ r > 1). This term is labelled q r (in reference to the q-ratio of Tobin):
More precisely, it is assumed that firms enter and exit by a law of motion, such aṡ n r = n r (q r − 1) which can be rewritten by using the share of firms located in one region (s 1 = n 1 n 1 +n 2 the share in region 1, and n w the number of firm in the world such as n w = n 1 + n 2 ):
the first equation indicates that firms are created in region 1 as long as production is more profitable there and the second equation shows that the total number of firms increases as long as profits are positive. However, and as we have seen, the location of firms depends partially on the location of workers.
Unskilled workers incur mobility costs that differ between individuals, these migration costs takes the form used by Tabuchi & Thisse (2002) . With V L 1 the indirect utility in 1, the probability that a worker will choose to reside in region 2 is given by:
where θ represents migration costs. The law of motion follows Tabuchi & Thisse (2002) and Russek (2008) :
2 /θ ] and by using the logarithm on the RHS and the LHS, one gets : C − θ log L 1 /L 1−L 1 /L = 0, where C represents workers' indirect utility differential that drives migration
By inserting equation (34) in equation (30) and by using equations (29) and (31) one can compute q 1 − q 2 , which allows one to analyse the location of firms (see equation (32)). In Figure 4 , we plot q 1 − q 2 with respect to s 1 for different values of trade costs φ and migration costs θ. One can see that trade liberalization leads to a progressive agglomeration of firms. Indeed in Figure 4 , the market crowding effect is the strongest force, relocation in region 1 generates a slump of profits which become negative there and positive in region 2. Thus, dispersion remains stable. But for a smaller level of trade costs, it becomes profitable for firms to relocate. Around 80% of firms choose region 1 (or 2 according to multiple equilibria) in Figure 4 . For even smaller trade costs the agglomeration becomes progressively total. In these two cases, the cluster of firms allows one to decrease the shipping costs between upstream and downstream firms and, moreover, the local spending of new entrepreneurs increases the demand in region 1. Then, these two agglomerative forces overcome the market crowding effect. 20 In Figure 4 , we also plot L 1 with respect to s 1 by using (34). One can see that the agglomeration of firms is linked to workers' agglomeration. However, the total agglomeration of firms occurs for a lower level of trade liberalization than workers' agglomeration. Indeed, in Figure 4 , all firms are agglomerated in region 1 (or in region 2 according to multiple equilibria), while this country attracts less than 80% of workers. When all firms are agglomerated, the differential of real wage is simplified by C = 1 − φ μ/σ −1 . Thus, because σ > 1, more trade liberalization decreases the relative welfare in the region 1 C , which leads to a dispersion of workers (see equation (34)). Figure 5 sums up these results by plotting the location of firms and workers with respect to trade freeness. Figure 5 illustrates that agglomeration of firms occurs gradually and stays stable until free trade, while a partial agglomeration of workers occurs only for intermediate levels of trade costs. To check the robustness of this result we have run numerous simulations and we have found the same trend with, however, one difference: the bifurcation diagram can be different according to migration costs. Indeed, with higher migration, trade liberalization generates a sudden and catastrophic agglomeration instead of the progressive process obtained here.
To conclude this theoretical section, we retain the main result of the two models.
Proposition 3 By liberalizing trade from high trade costs, a country can attract both capital and labour -the bifurcation pattern is a gradual peripheral exodus of workers associated with capital flight from the periphery -but after a threshold of trade costs, opening trade generates return migration toward the periphery while capital remains agglomerated in the core. 
Concluding Remarks
The literature on FDI and migration is now burgeoning, but the lack of theoretical foundation and the absence of one facet of globalization -trade -is problematic in terms of a static comparison and in terms of omitted variables. We have shown theoretically that the relationship between FDI and migration depends heavily on trade costs because these costs impact on the supply (cost linkage) as well as on the demand (demand linkage). We have also emphasized the importance of urban costs. The need to build market access and supplier access to trade data (à la Redding & Venables, 2004) and to take a closer look at urban costs are certainly promising areas of future research.
